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Abstract:  
This project is a follow up to Cassar, Wordofa, and Zhang (2015), which aimed at testing 
whether extending incentives beyond cash would alter the estimated competitive tendencies of 
men and women. Here we extend this work to an urban Colombian setting. In the previous 
study conducted in China, men have proven more competitive than women; however, once the 
incentive changes to a child-benefitting voucher, women increased their likeliness to compete. 
This research uses statistical and regression analysis to test whether or not women become 
more competitive when competing for a voucher, which directly benefits their child as opposed 
to cash. The results show that, in this urban Colombian setting, women prove equally 
competitive to their male counterparts regardless of the incentive. Interestingly, forced 
displacement proves to be a key determinant of a woman’s desire to compete.  
Keywords: Gender, Competitiveness, Displacement   
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1.      Introduction  
            In recent years, the topic of women’s empowerment has come to the forefront of 
discussions worldwide. Leaders in the field of development have suggested that women’s 
empowerment may be the key ingredient to economic progress (Duflo 2012). However, even 
the most developed countries struggle with gender inequality in the workplace.  In the U.S., a 
country in which more women than men get a postsecondary degree according to the 
Department of Education, women run a just twenty-six Fortune 500 companies. With this 
evidence proving that education disparity is not the reason behind the gap, a novel hypothesis 
attributes these gaps in female leadership to women’s lower desire to compete. This study tests 
the alternative hypothesis that promotes the female competitive drive by offering a noncash 
incentive that benefits their child.   
         Following the 2015 research in China by Cassar, Whordofa, and Zhang, we run an 
experiment to estimate whether women’s competitiveness is altered depending on the incentive 
one provides. Previous results follow biological theory, which dictates that men have a more 
competitive nature (Nierderle &Vesterlund 2007). However, women experience the height of 
competitiveness in dealings with their children’s wellbeing. This topic has extreme significance 
in the current social era where countries strive to promote gender equity in workplace 
advancement. The typical method to incentivize advancement comes in the form of monetary 
reward, but this research would suggest that an incentive specifically benefitting children 
might best promote equality, as the women’s competitive drive becomes heightened.  
This replication takes place in Medellin a city that, though classified as middle income 
internationally, has a large and growing amount of wealth inequality in part due to a large 
population of forcefully displaced individuals according to a publication put out by the City of 
Medellin (Como Vamos 2014). The experiment takes place in low-income schools throughout 
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Medellin and finds women and men statistically equal in their likeliness to compete. Further 
investigation shows that forcefully displaced women compete at rates almost twenty percent 
higher than other women do and that displacement status proves a better indicator of women’s 
likeliness to compete than any other tested indicators including gender.   
The following section describes relevant literature in the fields of evolutionary biology, 
sociology, and behavioral/experimental economics. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
experimental protocol along with a description of the data and summary statistics. The next section 
lays out the method of analysis including a random effects panel regression. Section 5 describes 
the results of both statistical and regression analyses. Finally, section 6 concludes with 
implications of the results.  
  
 2. Literature Review  
As a continuation of Cassar, Wordofa, and Zhang (2015), I replicate the experiment in a 
different cultural context to test whether women’s competitiveness is altered based on 
incentive. Continuing the original protocol, where they offer both cash and a voucher for their 
children’s schoolbooks as incentives for answering simple addition problems in separate rounds, 
participants choose whether to compete for the chance at an increased prize. Their results 
followed the original hypothesis presented by cash only incentive studies (Nierderle & 
Vesterlund 2007, Croson & Gneezy 2009), which dictate that men have a more competitive 
nature; however, women experience the height of competitiveness in dealings with their 
children’s wellbeing. The current research follows the same protocol offering both cash and a 
voucher, which their children can exchange for snacks at school.   
Understanding the dynamics of gender and competition one could draw from two 
distinct bodies of literature. At the base, the decision to compete has been described in detail for 
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decades in evolutionary theories. More recently, behavioral economists have taken interest in 
the subject using several experimental techniques leading to emerging theories in the area. The 
literature begins with Darwinian evolutionary theory and continues with more recent theory 
looking further into the biological components of gender-based competition. Next, a brief 
discussion of literature relating to intersectionality theory, repercussions of forced 
displacement, and the importance of replication to explain possible reasoning for this study’s 
divergence from the others. Lastly, economic models and recent empirical findings help to 
explain the importance of incentives, effort, and competitor’s ability in someone’s decision to 
compete and how this has been seen to differ by gender.  
   
2.1 Biological Theories of Competition  
In the most primitive examples, males compete for females in order to produce the 
maximum number of offspring (Darwin 1836).  This creates the premise of sexual selection 
theory where certain characteristics emerge within genders due to the mate preferences of the 
opposite gender. Sexual selection theory advances that, in most species, the female is pursued 
by males and therefore does not have the same desire to compete for a mate. This is not to say 
that females do not have a competitive drive, but rather that it is different and generally less 
intense than that of males within a species. However, we can clearly see variations in these both 
across species and environmental differences within species.   
In most cases, a male who does not copulate cannot do so because he fails to win the 
interest of a mate.  Females, on the other hand, are limited in the number of offspring, which 
they can produce biologically. This leads them to invest more in their limited offspring than the 
male who could, in theory, have dozens of offspring within his life. This child investment factor 
adds to the explanation of differences in gender competitiveness. Trivers (1972) states, 
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“Individuals of the sex investing less will compete among themselves to breed with members of 
the sex investing more, since an individual of the former can increase its reproductive success 
by investing successively in the offspring of several members if the limiting sex.” This leads to 
the competitive male behaviors explained in Darwin’s sexual selection theory.   
More recent theory in evolutionary biology moves past these perspectives to explain 
gender differences in competitive behavior (Hrdy 1999). They suggest that most theory has 
focused on male competition due to its overtly visible characteristics. However, though female 
intragender competition takes on a subtler and much less obvious form, they will readily 
engage in competition when necessary. Just as the males compete amongst themselves to get 
the best mate for reproduction, females must also compete to be and attain the most desirable 
mate. Differently than males who may fight or create a big display to attract their mate, females 
must display traits that portray resourcefulness and other traits desired for motherhood and 
because death in a fight would result in the endangerment of their children.   
Females find dominance and competition to be most beneficial in matters of child 
rearing and in competition for resources whereas males compete more for status and to appear 
attractive to females (Stockley and Campbell 2013). If a mother believes something will either 
benefit or harm her child, evidence shows that she will not hesitate to compete strategically. 
This idea holds with the initial research, in that, Chinese mothers became more competitive 
when the incentive benefitted their child. Anticipating the results, Colombian mothers, as a 
whole, did not follow the same pattern and chose to compete regardless of the incentive. 
Forcefully displaced mothers, however, show an increased rate of competition for the child-
benefitting voucher further proving the importance of situational differences.   
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2.2 Intersectionality and the Importance of Culture and Replication  
  Popular sociological literature on intersectionality can help us understand why parents 
playing the exact same game in different countries make heterogeneous competition choices. 
Intersectionality is the theory that explains that people fit into many demographic categories, 
which inform the decisions they make (Shields 2008). This may seem broad or obvious, but it 
speaks directly to the importance of replicating the same economic experiments across cultures 
as we have done here. An educated urban mother of middle income in post-communist China 
has vastly differing life experiences than an uneducated forcefully displaced indigenous mother 
in violence-ridden Colombia causing them to have different attitudes towards competition and 
its necessity in providing for their children. Further subdividing, intersectionality explains why 
women of the same nationality could make different choices due to their experiences or 
displacement status as is the case in the current study.  
  Similarly, other social scientists have studied the “biosocial” qualities of gender. Wood and 
Eagly (2002) combine psychology, anthropology, sociology, and biology to explain that, “sex 
differences in social behavior arise from the distribution of men and women into social roles 
within a society” and how these roles vary depending on societal characteristics. Empirically, 
researchers have used experiments to understand this phenomenon. Andersen et al. study 
competitiveness in both matrilocal and patriarchal villages in India and find that, at age seven, 
girls and boys are equally competitive in both society types. Through puberty and definitively 
by age fifteen, girls in the patriarchal society become measurably less competitive than their 
male counterparts whereas girls in matriarchal societies remain equally competitive despite the 
two villages being geographically close (Andersen et. al. 2013). In an international study, 
Cardenas et. al. (2012) play games with children from both Colombia and Sweden. Surprisingly, 
Colombian girls age nine to twelve are equally competitive to boys in all tasks, but in Sweden (a 
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country with higher gender equality rankings) boys are more compete overall. However, in 
certain tasks, girls’ competitiveness exceeds that of boys. This research supports the current 
study in that competitive differences should not simply be dismissed as a biological fact, but 
rather can be affected by culture and circumstance.  
  
2.2.1 Forced Displacement and Competition  
Colombia has now spent more than forty years in a violent civil conflict. Quantifying 
what displaced people have lost, may go a long way to understanding their behavior. Ibanez and 
Velez (2008) apply welfare loss theory to Colombian displacement. In creating their model, they 
distinguish two types of displacement: preventative and reactive. This separates the displaced 
into people who moved because something might/was likely to happen and those who moved 
after a violent act occurred. They use a complex derivation of compensation variation with 
household characteristics and present losses in the form of net present value of rural aggregate 
consumption finding that displacement has costs as high as 37% of total income. An estimate 
that is higher than the supposed costs of crime and disease.   
  After losing over a third of their total income, a displaced person choosing to risk her 
earnings and compete for a higher valued prize seems intuitive. However, discerning the 
mechanisms of how these monetary needs cause differing competitive attitudes, require models 
beyond the reach of biological and social models.  
  
2.3 Economics and Gender Competitiveness  
  Rent seeking, as formulated by Tullock (1980), is the idea that individuals want to increase 
their share of wealth without creating new wealth. Individuals incur a cost when the effort is 
expended to play, which plays into their decision-making and value placed on winning (Baik 
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1994). This is the case in the present study, where players want to maximize their earnings 
while deciding if they can extend enough effort to defeat an opponent. Chowdhury and 
Shermeta (2010) use these ideas to create a generalized model to show payoffs to winning as a 
linear function of prizes, personal effort, and competitor effort. They distinguish between a 
winning prize (W) and losing prize (L) such that the W>0 and W>L. Effort levels should 
depend upon the value of winning the prize and the cost of a player’s effort as well as the effort 
costs of their competitor.   
 In closer relation to the current research, the expected payoff from competition should 
correlate to the participants’ value of the prize in that round (cash or voucher) and will vary 
depending on the amount of effort they expend to answer a given amount of addition problems. 
That is, if a person finds the problems easy and is able to answer all twenty within the time 
limit, they may value the prize less than someone who must put in more effort to answer the 
same number of questions. The first person may be tempted to put in less effort if they know 
they can defeat their opponent, however, this assumes complete information, which does not 
hold in this case as participants are assigned an anonymous competitor.   
  Asymmetric information implies that people choose a given effort level when competing, 
but do not know how their competition will perform. According to the model set out by Baik 
(1994), effort levels will vary according to both personal ability and perceived opponent ability 
and this level of effort will determine their probability of winning. Players must choose how 
much effort to put forth without knowing how much effort their opponent will give in any 
given round. In this scenario, the weaker player can, in fact, be the Nash winner if they exert a 
high enough level of effort to surpass their higher ability opponent. Our case differs in that 
players are given the option of not competing at all. This could in turn lead to the highest 
ability players choosing not to compete due to outside factors like behavioral preferences.   
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  Several behavioral preferences have been proven to impact decisions to compete namely: 
risk preferences, social preferences, and competitive preferences (Croson and Gneezy 2009). 
Comparing across multiple competition experiments in various countries, researchers show that 
women are naturally more risk averse than men, but given the right incentive and social 
situation, women’s competitiveness can near that of a man. Using the empirical data, Cotton et 
al. (2010) present a theoretical framework for gender competitiveness, which would suggest 
that the only consistent reasons for gender differences in competition include lower male risk 
aversion, increased male ability under competition due to heightened testosterone and 
adrenaline, and a greater satisfaction from winning for males than females.   
Applying these principles to labor markets has recently gained in importance. Many 
countries have begun affirmative action programs in an attempt to incentivize women to 
compete in the upper ranks of the labor market because traditional economic theories have 
attributed gender differences in the labor market to discrimination and differences in human 
capital accumulation (Altonji and Blank 1999). However, these policies have produced 
underwhelming results. This connects directly to the research presented which would suggest a 
shift in incentive types, as opposed to simply increasing cash salaries, may prove better a more 
successful alternative.  
3. Data and Methodology  
  All data for this project stems from a set of “lab in the field” experiments conducted in six 
schools with a combined twenty-two sessions over several weeks in Medellin, Colombia.  
The Secretary of Education in Medellin facilitated randomization and recruiting of schools. 
Medellin ranks schools on a socio-economic scale ranging from one to six. This is calculated by 
adding up necessities and assets within a household such as a refrigerator or a permanently 
fixed roof.  Participants in this research are parents from schools with a ranking of one or two. 
The 194 participants each play a total of seven games and complete an in depth survey during 
the two-hour sessions. Each player receives 20,000 COP in cash (5-6 times the hourly minimum 
wage) as a show up fee and differing amounts based on performance in the chosen round. This 
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could add up to totals nearing a full day’s worth wages depending on their performance. One 
round is randomly selected after the experiment is complete and players are paid according to 
their earnings in this round only. This ensures that players play every round to the best of their 
ability without correlation to the previous rounds.   
The first five games follow a similar protocol in that participants have three minutes to 
answer as many horizontal, two-digit addition problems as possible with a maximum of twenty. 
The payment method is the main differentiation between each round.  Rounds three through 
five are played in a random order selected before each session, so that we do not just capture 
learning effects.    
Example:  
45+30+65+95=_______________  
  In the first round, referred to as “Piece Rate”, participants are given three minutes to 
answer as many addition problems as they can. They receive 1,000 COP (approximately $0.34 
USD) for each correct answer. Making the maximum round one earnings 20,000 COP. All 
earnings in this round are paid in cash.   
  Round two “Tournament” uses the same type of questions and time constraint, but forces all 
players to compete. Players compete against a randomly generated, anonymous partner. They 
will never find out who their partner is and will only know if they won if this round is selected 
for payment. Winners in this round are paid 3,000 COP per correct answer (about $1 USD) and 
losers get zero. Again, players will receive earnings for this round in cash if it is selected.    
  The third round allows participants to choose between the previous two payment methods. 
Before the round begins, participants are given a piece of paper on which they must circle either 
“Piece Rate” or “Tournament.” If they select piece rate, this round is identical to round one and 
players are paid 1,000 COP for every correct answer. The tournament option is exactly like 
round two with winners receiving 3,000 COP in cash per correct answer and losers receiving 
nothing. However, it should be noted that those who choose the tournament option are 
competing against the same opponent’s round two score to ensure they are always competing 
against the score of someone also competing.   
 11  
  
  Round four is identical to round three in every way except that, instead of cash, players 
compete for tokens of equal value redeemable at their child’s school store. With these tokens, 
their children can buy snacks, drinks, and in some cases cooked items like empanadas. To 
ensure children could not trade the tokens from others, the parents’ names were placed on the 
back of each token during distribution. For scale, a child could buy almost any single item in 
the store with 3,000 COP.  
  In round five, players followed the exact same protocol from the two previous rounds, but 
competed for a gender-neutral voucher. For this, we used a voucher to go towards their electric 
bill. The data from this round is unfortunately unusable due to many parents not paying their 
electric bill in the anticipated manner and therefore valuing the voucher at zero.   
  After the final addition test, subjects are asked how they felt their competitor did in the 
mandated tournament round (2). This will be compared to the subject’s own score in order to 
create a proxy for their confidence in their ability. Women have tended to overestimate their 
partners’ ability in this stage of the experiment. Following this, participants play a standard 
risk game in which they choose one of six payout pairs of varying riskiness when told each half 
of the pair has equal probability of being drawn.  
  Round six tests the players’ risk tolerance/aversion on a scale of 1-6 with one being the 
most risk averse and six being the most risk tolerant. This game asks participants to choose 
one of six payout pairs. Each payout within the pair has a fifty percent chance of being chosen 
and is decided with a coin toss. In the least risky pair, players received the same low amount 
regardless of the coins toss result.   
Finally, we reach round seven designed to measure the subject’s value of the chosen 
voucher. This shows whether men and women value the vouchers equally or whether a 
difference exists between genders. In order to do this, participants choose between a voucher 
and cash prize of varying amounts less than, equal to, and greater than the actual value of the 
voucher. This method, however, proved difficult for participants to fully grasp. Therefore, the 
survey employs an additional question, which asks how helpful the voucher is to them, which 
ranges from “0-Not at all helpful” to “3- Extremely helpful.” Due to concerns with variation in 
understanding of the seventh game, this analysis uses the latter as a proxy for willingness to 
pay.  
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4. Model and Hypothesis  
  This experiment investigates gender differences in competitiveness under both a cash 
payment scheme and payment in the form of a voucher, which benefits their child. The baseline 
model and null hypothesis (set forth by Cassar, Wordofa, and Zhang (2015) in the original 
study) are as follows:  
Choiceit = β0 + β1Genderi + β2Treatmentt + β3Gender ∗ Treatmentit + β4WTPit + 
β5Riskit + β6Confidenceit + β7 controls + ui  
H0: β3 = 0  
HA: β3 ≠ 0  
  This equation represents a panel estimation, in which, the dependent variable 
represents the choice to compete of an individual (i) where choice is a dummy variable coded 
as  
choosing a piece rate game 0 or a tournament game coded as 1 with a given treatment (t) 
either cash or voucher. This sets up a panel dataset where each observation is an individual 
within a certain treatment as opposed to an individual over time as in traditional panel data. 
The preliminary estimation includes only 𝛽1-𝛽3. The first variable is gender, which will 
simply be coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. If theory holds, this should show females 
less likely to compete. In addition, there is a Treatment variable, which, as stated, has a 
value of 1 for voucher and 0 for cash. Finally, an interaction variable between the two 
creates the main variable of interest. This tests the null hypothesis that the 𝛽3 coefficient 
for a female, representing her likeliness to compete in the school voucher round, is 
statistically the same as that of a male.   
  A second set of regressions includes results from games 5 and 6 as well as a measure 
of confidence. WTP is used to assess the value participants place on the voucher. Risk 
preference ranges from 1-6 from most to least risk averse. Finally, confidence is measured 
by taking the difference of the participants’ guess as to how their competitor performed in 
the tournament round from how they did. The higher the number, the more confidence a 
participant is seen to have.  
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  The analysis continues by gradually adding in control variables beginning with a 
control for the participants’ score in the forced tournament round, which could easily be 
argued to influence a person’s decision to compete. If one knows that they can achieve 19 of 
the 20 math problems in the competition round, it is reasonable to think they would choose 
to compete based on their meager probability of losing regardless of their gender.  
   Further models include controls of age (in years), categorical education (scaled 1-4 
for primary, secondary, technical, and university), and income range. Each regression also 
uses robust standard errors and random effects. Using random effects allows us to capture 
the effects of being in different sessions without dropping out time invariant variable such 
as gender.  
  In addition to this panel regression, the same model is run through a probit 
estimation for each of the two choice rounds (Round 3 and Round 4). A probit estimation is 
appropriate here because the outcome variable is a dummy represented as 1 if the 
participant chose to compete and 0 if not. The main variable of interest in this case would is 
“Female” since treatments are separated. Results from this estimation are expected to 
match, and therefore reinforce, the panel regression.   
5. Data Analysis    
5.1 Summary Statistics  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for notable variables in which gender differences 
might cause concern. The average age in this sample is around 42 years old with men being 
slightly older than the women. Education statistics show that the average person has 
somewhere between a primary and secondary education. Though men have more education on 
average, the difference is not significant. Income takes on a value 1-5 each representing a range 
of personal income in the last week. Increments were divided equally from “below $170.000 
COP (about $54 USD)” to “above $500.000 COP (about $158 USD).” Unlike the previous 
measure, income differs based on gender within our sample with males reporting to earn 
significantly more than females. This holds the cultural expectations in Colombia and, 
therefore, likely represents the society as a whole.   
Because participants see the number of correct answers they achieve after each round is 
graded, scores plausibly affect their likelihood of competing. Despite having negligible variation 
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in education, the sample shows men answering significantly more questions correctly than 
women in all rounds do. This imbalance could have a significant impact on participant’s 
likelihood of competing in choice rounds and therefore warrant inclusion in the extended 
regression.  
Cotton et al. (2015) use a theoretical model to suggest that lower male risk aversion 
may partially contribute to the gender gap in competitive outcomes. However, this study finds 
no difference in risk preference based on gender. Additionally, their model rules out male 
overconfidence and female under confidence as probable factors based on previous empirical 
research. Conversely, our measure of confidence shows that men are slightly over confident and 
women significantly under confident. Further investigation on the impact this has on their 
likelihood to compete can be found in the results section. Lastly, we find that male and female 
participants are willing to pay balanced amounts for the voucher provided.    
5.2 Results  
The analysis begins with t-tests showing the differences in likeliness to compete both 
within and between genders shown below in Figure 1. Genders are insignificantly different in 
their likeliness to compete for cash, which differs from other literature. Interestingly, the same 
number of men and women chose to compete in the child voucher round as in the cash round. 
Table 2 demonstrates that, though many people switched their decision from compete to not 
compete or the opposite, the overall totals remained exactly the same. This result suggests that 
Colombian women are equally competitive to men regardless of incentive. Because the result is 
inconsistent with all previous versions of this experiment, we look to regression analysis for 
further explanation.  
Table 3 reports panel regression results set out in the previous section. Column 1 shows 
the baseline results. Neither treatment, gender, nor their interaction prove sufficient in 
explaining willingness to compete according to this specification. Therefore, unlike in Cassar, 
Wordofa, and Zhang, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that women and men are equally 
likely to compete despite incentive type. Adding in the score from their tournament round in 
Column 2, demonstrates that score has a positive and significant impact on a participants’ 
competitive tendencies. This makes sense, in that, the higher a participant’s score in the 
tournament round the more likely they are to compete in future choice rounds.  
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Columns 3,4, and 5 add in games played to assess risk, willingness to pay, and confidence 
respectively. Column 4 shows that the more a person is willing to pay for the voucher, the more 
likely they are to compete in the voucher round. For the last addition to the base regression, 
column 6 adds controls for age, education, and income. An F-test proves their joint significance 
at the 5% level despite insignificance on their own.   
For further robustness, Table 4 presents results for probit regressions run on the cash 
and voucher rounds separately. The columns on the left show the results for participants’ 
likeliness to compete for cash. Holding true with the panel regression, the point estimates show 
women are less competitive than men are, but not significantly so. Score again holds as a 
significant determinant of likeliness to compete throughout. Similarly, the right-hand side 
demonstrates the results for likeliness to compete for the child-benefitting voucher. The results 
are the same except the measure for Willingness to Pay (WTP) proves significant at the 5% 
level similar to the panel regression. Tables 5 and 6 separate these regressions even further by 
gender. Table 5 suggest that none of the presented independent variables significantly explain a 
woman’s likeliness to compete with the exception of the willingness to pay measure in the 
voucher round. The male only regressions shown in Table 6 present the intuitive result that 
men who score higher in the initial tournament round prove more likely to compete when given 
the choice in later rounds.  For further robustness, all models were checked with robust and 
bootstrapped standard errors and yielded nearly identical results. 
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Figure 1: Likeliness to Compete
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5.3 Additional Interesting Results   
Colombia is currently ending more than 40 years of civil strife within the country. This 
conflict has caused many families to be displaced from their homes including nearly 40% of our 
sample. In looking to better understand people’s decision to compete and why women seem to 
be more competitive in this sample, I follow a similar analysis process as in the previous section. 
Figure 2 shows how displacement seems to play a significant part in determining whether a 
woman will compete both for cash and for the school voucher. With an increase of 20% in the 
voucher incentive. Men, on the other hand, compete at similar rates regardless of displacement 
status.   
 
Table 7 shows the results from a panel regression similar to the one set out in section 4 
with the addition of a binary independent variable, which takes the value of 1 if the person 
indicated that they or a member of their immediate had been forcefully displaced, and 0 
otherwise. Due to understandable multicollinearity between the interaction presented in row 3 
and the displacement variable, inflated variances cause the t-stat to appear insignificant. To 
remedy this, the fourth labeled “Displaced+Displaced*Female” combines this variable with its 
gender using the lincom command to reflect the true significance of displacement on a woman’s 
likeliness to compete. This command isolates the increased female likeliness to compete under 
displacement as if all men were dropped from the sample. Therefore, the coefficient on the first 
row “Displaced” represents the impact of displacement on males’ likeliness to compete. The 
result reinforces the outcome in Figure 2 showing that, once gender is controlled for, women 
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Figure 2: Likeliness to Compete by Displacement 
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who were forcefully displaced compete at rates more than fifteen percent higher than those who 
did not face forced displacement. This remains robust, and even strengthens, throughout all 
models.  To reinforce this result further, Table 8 presents the final panel specification using an 
estimation with bootstrapped standard errors. This method, which generates many random 
samples from the given data, uses an iterative method thereby generating accurate and more 
robust standard errors. In this table, the interaction term of interest “Female*Displacement” 
shows displaced women choose to compete about 18% more often than non-displaced males, 
which is in alignment with the t-test and lincom estimate. 
Table 9 presents results from probit regressions run separately for each of the incentives 
and illustrates significantly increased likeliness to compete in the voucher round for displaced 
individuals. Tables 10 and 11 separate by gender. Table 10 demonstrates that likeliness to 
compete, as predicted in Table 7, increases significantly for forcefully displaced women. Men, 
on the other hand, increase in likeliness to compete with increased scores and, in the case of the 
voucher treatment, increased competitiveness.   
6. Conclusion   
Diverging from traditional thought and previous experimental evidence from other 
cultures, women and men in Medellin prove equally likely to compete for both cash and a child-
benefitting voucher. Additionally, women who have been forcefully displaced prove 
significantly more likely to compete for both cash and the voucher than do women who have 
not faced displacement. Displaced women have incurred extreme monetary costs and been 
removed from their social network possibly making it more acceptable to compete in a 
traditionally patriarchal society. Men have significantly higher scores and confidence levels, 
which increase their likeliness to compete. This is an intuitive result because knowingly having 
a high score necessarily increases one’s chances of winning in a competition thereby 
heightening desire to compete.  
This result demonstrates the importance of replication across cultures and even using 
subgroups of the same culture. The culture in which a person is raised and the norms they are 
expected to follow will undeniably shape their behaviors and decision-making. Without 
replication one could not predict that Colombia, a country that has increased gender inequality 
attributed to the Machismo culture, would have women that compete at rates statistically equal 
men (Weiss 2014). A result which differs from countries traditionally thought of as more 
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gender equal like the United States (Croson and Gneezy 2009) and China (Cassar, Wordofa, 
and Zhang 2015) where women are less competitive for cash and, in the case of the latter, only 
equally competitive for a voucher which benefits their child.   
These studies suggest that changing incentives may inspire women’s advancement in the 
workplace, but the current results infers that equal quantitative education and empowerment 
for women must come first. Policies that improve performance while encouraging women’s 
empowerment will also increase the confidence of women and ideally their desire to compete in 
the workplace. This may include incentivizing girls to stay in school or, even more, to pursue 
STEM fields thereby equalizing them to males as they enter the workforce. If then a gap in 
workplace inequality still pervades, a change in incentive structure may be in order.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Means reported with standard deviations in parentheses   
       Overall  Male   Female  H0: difference=0  
      n=193  n=74  n=119  p-value  
Age     42.226  44.091  41.117  0.0701  
      (10.568)  (11.932)  (9.552)     
Education     1.523  1.496  1.568  0.582  
      (0.878)  (0.862)  (0.908)     
Income     1.746  2.027  1.568  0.007  
      (1.16)  (1.284)  (1.042)     
Work Full Time     0.505   0.627   0.497    0.007  
      (0.501)   (0.486)  (0.429)     
Piece Rate Score     7.98  10.08  6.655  0  
      (5.525)  (5.716)  (4.987)     
Tournament Score     8.495  10.627  7.151  0  
      (5.82)  (5.893)  (5.377)     
Risk Tolerance     3.607  3.667  3.569  0.726  
      (1.877)  (1.913)  (1.861)     
Confidence     -1.368  0.353  -2.368  0.0017  
      (5.742)  (5.098)  (5.877)     
Willingness to Pay     2.351  2.307  2.378  0.611  
      (0.95)  (0.885)  (0.991)     
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Table 2: Change in Choice to Compete Across Treatment  
Change in Competition 
Choice   
Male  Female  Total  
-1  5  11  16  
0  65  97  162  
1  5  11  16  
Total  75  119  194  
  
  
Table 3: Likeliness to Compete  
  Base  Score  Risk  WTP  Confidence  Random  
Effect  
Controls  
Treatment  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.015  -0.015  0.000  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.00)  
Female  -0.053  -0.004  0.002  -0.001  -0.018  -0.018  0.019  
  (0.72)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.22)  
Female*Treatment  -0.000  0.000  -0.017  -0.017  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.15)  
Tournament Score    0.014**  0.015**  0.015**  0.014*  0.014*  0.010  
    (2.40)  (2.40)  (2.48)  (1.70)  (1.70)  (1.17)  
Risk      0.015  0.013  0.014  0.014  0.015  
      (0.82)  (0.73)  (0.73)  (0.73)  (0.75)  
WTP        0.066*  0.065*  0.065*  0.084**  
        (1.93)  (1.86)  (1.86)  (2.25)  
Confidence          0.003  0.003  0.007  
          (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.81)  
Age  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.003  
(0.67)  
Education  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.048  
(1.07)  
Income  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.028  
(0.89)  
Constant  0.507***  0.357***  0.297**  0.147  0.176  0.176  0.376  
  (8.75)  (4.23)  (2.56)  (1.05)  (1.11)  (1.11)  (1.30)  
N  388  388  382  382  364  364  330  
Observations  194  194  191  191  182  182  165  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Likeliness to Compete  
Probit Estimation  
 
   Cash  Voucher  
  
Female  -0.133  -0.00  0.003  -0.040  0.079  -0.133  -0.017  -0.034  -0.038  -0.052  -0.013  
  (0.185)  (0.196)  (0.197)  (0.206)  (0.229)  (0.185)  (0.195)  (0.197)  (0.206)  (0.208)  (0.236)  
Tournament  
Score  
  0.038**  0.036**  0.0467**  0.048*    0.034**  0.038**  0.027  0.026  0.008  
    (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.025)    (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.026)  
Risk      0.027  0.043  0.050      0.048  0.040  0.032  0.031  
      (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.055)      (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.057)  
Confidence        -0.013  -0.013        0.018  0.024  0.047*  
        (0.022)  (0.023)        (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024)  
WTP                    0.219**  0.298***  
                    (0.103)  (0.112)  
Age          0.002            -0.017  
          (0.011)            (0.011)  
Education          -0.051            -0.235*  
          (0.126)            (0.131)  
Income          -0.035            -0.116  
          (0.089)            (0.092)  
Constant  0.0167  -0.387*  -0.468  -0.593  -0.645  0.017  -0.339  -0.563*  -0.413  -0.872*  0.422  
  
  
(0.145)  
  
(0.230)  
  
(0.318)  
  
(0.389)  
  
(0.762)  
  
(0.145)  
  
(0.228)  
  
(0.318)  
  
(0.387)  
  
(0.449)  
  
(0.826)  
  
Observations  194  194  191  182  165  194  194  191  182  182  165  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5: Likeliness to Compete-Female Only  
Probit Estimation  
 
   Cash  Voucher  
  
  
Tournament  
Score  
  
0.009  
  
-0.000  
  
0.028  
  
0.027  
  
0.018  
  
0.025  
  
0.036  
  
0.030  
  
0.022  
  (0.0212)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.035)  
Risk    -0.027  0.002  0.022    0.074  0.098  0.090  0.089  
    (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.070)    (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.073)  
Confidence      -0.031  -0.032      -0.005  0.003  0.029  
      (0.027)  (0.029)      (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.030)  
WTP                0.256**  0.355**  
                (0.129)  (0.139)  
Age        0.009          0.006  
        (0.015)          (0.016)  
Edu        0.111          -0.060  
        (0.170)          (0.174)  
Income        0.005          -0.117  
        (0.117)          (0.122)  
Constant  -0.184  -0.011  -0.393  -0.959  -0.242  -0.598*  -0.775*  -1.305**  -1.281  
  (0.192)  (0.332)  (0.423)  (0.916)  (0.193)  (0.337)  (0.428)  (0.512)  (1.042)  
  
Observations  
  
119  
  
116  
  
114  
  
105  
  
119  
  
116  
  
114  
  
114  
  
105  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Table 6: Likeliness to Compete-Male Only  
Probit Estimation  
 
   Cash  Voucher  
  
    
Tournament  0.080***  
Score  
  
0.086***  
  
0.066*  
  
0.073*  
  
0.055**  
  
0.055**  
  
0.006  
  
0.007  
  
-0.013  
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.040)  
Risk    0.100  0.078  0.095    0.003  -0.088  -0.097  -0.080  
    (0.081)  (0.089)  (0.096)    (0.079)  (0.089)  (0.090)  (0.100)  
Confidence      0.044  0.025      0.086**  0.091**  0.097**  
      (0.040)  (0.042)      (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.047)  
WTP                0.170  0.301  
                (0.179)  (0.218)  
Age        -0.082          -0.042**  
        (0.017)          (0.018)  
Education        -0.232          -0.401*  
        (0.215)          (0.227)  
Income        -0.108          -0.192  
        (0.146)          (0.151)  
Constant  -0.835**  -1.258***  -0.951  -0.204  -0.571*  -0.584  0.266  -0.101  2.592**  
  (0.326)  (0.476)  (0.607)  (1.200)  (0.309)  (0.448)  (0.593)  (0.714)  (1.298)  
  
Observations  
  
75  
  
75  
  
68  
  
60  
  
75  
  
75  
  
68  
  
68  
  
60  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7: Likeliness to Compete with Forced Displacement 
Panel Estimation 
 
 
  
  
Base  
  
Score  
  
Risk  
  
WTP  
  
Confidence  
  
Controls  
  
  
Displaced  
  
0.0502  
  
0.0816  
  
0.0771  
  
0.0619  
  
0.0884  
  
0.125  
  (0.113)  (0.112)  (0.112)  (0.112)  (0.119)  (0.128)  
Female  -0.102  -0.0440  -0.0519  -0.0530  -0.0655  -0.0184  
  (0.0850)  (0.0869)  (0.0882)  (0.0878)  (0.0912)  (0.0977)  
Displaced*Female  0.116  0.0914  0.101  0.0965  0.103  0.110  
  (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.141)  (0.148)  (0.159)  
Displaced+Displaced*Female  0.165*  0.1729**  0.178**  0.158*  0.1918**  0.2348**  
  (0.086)  (0.0849)  (0.0867)  (0.087)  (0.0888)  (0.096)  
Treatment  0.0104  0.0104  -0  -0  -0.00556  0.00613  
  (0.0286)  (0.0286)  (0.0281)  (0.0281)  (0.0289)  (0.0295)  
Tournament Score    0.0151**  0.0154**  0.0158**  0.0134  0.0101  
    (0.00590)  (0.00615)  (0.00612)  (0.00830)  (0.00899)  
Risk      0.0121  0.0115  0.0109  0.00957  
      (0.0181)  (0.0181)  (0.0189)  (0.0199)  
WTP        0.0587*  0.0557  0.0740**  
        (0.0351)  (0.0356)  (0.0377)  
Confidence          0.00512  0.00965  
          (0.00796)  (0.00842)  
Age  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.000994 
(0.00384)  
Education  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.0406  
(0.0452)  
Income  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0.0190  
(0.0322)  
Constant  0.485***  0.315***  0.274**  0.143  0.181  0.278  
  (0.0670)  (0.0936)  (0.122)  (0.145)  (0.165)  (0.293)  
  
Observations  
  
384  
  
384  
  
378  
  
378  
  
360  
  
326  
Number of id  192  192  189  189  180  163  
 *p<0.1,** p<0.05; *** p<0.01    
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Table 8: Bootstrap Standard Errors Estimation 
VARIABLES Choice 
Forced Displaced 0.0525 
  (0.0620) 
Female -0.0747 
  (0.0463) 
Displaced*Female 0.177** 
  (0.0745) 
Treatment -0.00565 
  (0.0319) 
Tournament 
Score 
0.00739* 
  (0.00428) 
Risk 0.0188* 
  (0.0104) 
WTP 0.0712*** 
  (0.0206) 
Confidence 0.0100** 
  (0.00443) 
Constant 0.373*** 
  (0.125) 
 Controls Yes  
Observations 354 
Number of id 177 
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Table 9: Likeliness to Compete with Forced Displacement  
Probit 
 
  Cash  Voucher  
Displaced  0.247  0.295  0.302  0.355*  0.436**  0.375**  0.423**  0.423** 0.545***  0.496**  0.655***  
  (0.188)  (0.190)  (0.192)  (0.199)  (0.216)  (0.189)  (0.191)  (0.194)  (0.203)  (0.206)  (0.227)  
Female  -0.144  -0.010  -0.011  -0.053  0.099  -0.165  -0.041  -0.0612  -0.0692  -0.087  0.004  
  (0.187)  (0.197)  (0.199)  (0.208)  (0.232)  (0.187)  (0.197)  (0.199)  (0.209)  (0.211)  (0.239)  
Tournament  
Score  
  0.040**  0.038**  0.045*  0.047*    0.039**  0.043**  0.0315  0.030  0.014  
    (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.025)    (0.017)  (0.0173)  (0.0233)  (0.024)  (0.026)  
Risk      0.020  0.033  0.037      0.0435  0.0330  0.030  0.022  
      (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.056)      (0.0514)  (0.0545)  (0.055)  (0.059)  
Confidence        -0.006  -0.005        0.0227  0.027  0.0523**  
        (0.022)  (0.023)        (0.0224)  (0.023)  (0.025)  
WTP                    0.183*  0.259**  
                    (0.105)  (0.114)  
Age          0.006            -0.013  
          (0.011)            (0.011)  
Education          -0.018            -0.235*  
          (0.127)            (0.134)  
Income          -0.036            -0.077  
          (0.091)            (0.094)  
Constant  -0.083  -0.528**  -0.577*  -0.674*  -0.989  -0.092  -0.52**  -0.72**  -0.591  -0.969**  0.037  
  (0.159)  (0.246)  (0.327)  (0.398)  (0.791)  (0.159)  (0.244)  (0.330)  (0.400)  (0.459)  (0.844)  
  
Observations  
  
192  
  
192  
  
189  
  
180  
  
163  
  
192  
  
192  
  
189  
  
180  
  
180  
  
163  
*p<0.1,** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 10: Likeliness to Compete with Forced Displacement 
Probit-Female Only  
 
  Cash  Voucher  
  
Displaced  0.348  0.355  0.400*  0.411*  0.576**  0.493**  0.503**  0.507**  0.585**  0.528**  0.773** 
*  
  (0.237)  (0.237)  (0.242)  (0.249)  (0.275)  (0.238)  (0.239)  (0.244)  (0.253)  (0.257)  (0.288)  
Tournament  
Score  
  0.012  0.0019  0.022  0.019    0.0188  0.025  0.0275  0.024  0.012  
    (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.034)    (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.036)  
Risk      -0.032  -0.005  0.013      0.057  0.079  0.074  0.065  
      (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.072)      (0.067)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.077)  
Confidence        -0.020  -0.018        0.007  0.012  0.045  
        (0.028)  (0.030)        (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.032)  
WTP                    0.208  0.311**  
                    (0.132)  (0.141)  
Age          0.015            0.011  
          (0.015)            (0.016)  
Education          0.168            -0.072  
          (0.177)            (0.183)  
Income          0.031            -0.056  
          (0.120)            (0.125)  
Constant  -0.268*  -0.360  -0.182  -0.482  -1.428  -0.305**  -0.445**  -0.730**  -0.848*  -1.272**  -1.531  
  (0.151)  (0.220)  (0.344)  (0.430)  (0.947)  (0.151)  (0.222)  (0.352)  (0.438)  (0.519)  (1.067)  
  
Observations  
  
118  
  
118  
  
115  
  
113  
  
104  
  
118  
  
118  
  
115  
  
113  
  
113  
  
104  
*p<0.1,** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 11: Likeliness to Compete with Forced Displacement 
Probit-Male Only  
 
   Cash  Voucher  
  
Displaced  0.076  0.266  0.243  0.320  0.352  0.177  0.336  0.331  0.502  0.464  0.516  
  (0.308)  (0.325)  (0.328)  (0.356)  (0.389)  (0.309)  (0.324)  (0.325)  (0.360)  (0.366)  (0.412)  
Tournament  
Score  
  0.082***  0.087***  0.069*  0.077*    0.066**  0.066**  0.024  0.025  0.007  
    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.042)    (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.042)  
Risk      0.089  0.064  0.077      0.015  -0.080  -0.084  -0.068  
      (0.083)  (0.092)  (0.099)      (0.081)  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.103)  
Confidence        0.046  0.027        0.083*  0.086**  0.088*  
        (0.041)  (0.043)        (0.042)  (0.04)  (0.047)  
WTP                    0.155  0.278  
                    (0.181)  (0.223)  
Age          -0.005            -0.040**  
          (0.018)            (0.018)  
Education          -0.217            -0.371*  
          (0.214)            (0.224)  
Income          -0.133            -0.168  
          (0.149)            (0.153)  
Constant  -0.026  -0.966**  -1.332***  -1.054  -0.436  -0.026  -0.772**  -0.832*  -0.104  -0.443  2.033  
  (0.179)  (0.376)  (0.509)  (0.657) (1.295)  (0.179)  (0.359)  (0.483)  (0.637)  (0.757)  (1.333)  
  
Observations  
  
74  
  
74  
  
74  
    
67  59  
  
74  
  
74  
  
74  
  
67  
  
67  
  
59  
*p<0.1,** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
  
  
